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Daniel J. Mahoney

“The Abusive Exploitation of the Human
Religious Sentiment”: Michael Burleigh
as Historian of “Political Religion”
Michael Burleigh, a distinguished English historian, is the author of a remarkable trilogy on the “political religions” that
have been the scourge of late modernity.
In his authoritative The Third Reich: A
New History (2000)1 Burleigh studied Nazi
Germany as a form of totalitarian society.
In doing so, he rehabilitated the category
of “political religion” as the indispensable
interpretive framework for deciphering
the National Socialist enigma. That book
provides a detailed account of the “moral
breakdowns and transformations of an
advanced industrial society,” one where
Hitler’s “rage against the world was capable of infinite generalization.” Burleigh
eloquently locates the atavistic modernism at the heart of National Socialism:
Nazi ideology offered redemption from a national ontological crisis, to which it was attracted like a predatory shark to blood. . . .
It lacked Communism’s deferred, but dialectically assured, ‘happy ending,’ and was
haunted by and suffused with apocalyptic
imaginings and beliefs which were self-consciously pagan and primitive. Although it
paradoxically claimed to speak the language
of applied reason . . . Nazism had one foot in
the dark, irrational world of Teutonic myth.
(TTR, 12)

In the Introduction to The Third Reich
and again in the later volumes of his tril42
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ogy, Burleigh expresses his fundamental
debts to earlier antitotalitarian thinkers
including Eric Voegelin, Raymond Aron,
and Waldemar Gurian. They were among
the first to confront this strange phenomenon of “political religion” in its hypermodernist manifestations. With their help,
Burleigh explores what the early twentieth-century Italian Catholic statesman
and political thinker Luigi Sturzo called
the “abusive exploitation of the human religious sentiment” by the totalitarian ideologies of our time. Burleigh’s eloquently
written books are informed by impressive
erudition and by deep moral seriousness,
but he is not a philosophic historian in the
manner of those such as Alain Besançon
and Martin Malia who have delved deeply
into the intellectual origins and the elusive
“pseudo-reality” posited by totalitarian
ideology.2 He is, instead, an antitotalitarian historian of evident theistic and Christian conviction.
Burleigh shows how National Socialism
was founded on an almost unimaginable
demonic willfulness, with a monstrous
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disregard for “charity, reason, and skepticism.” Like its frère-ennemi Bolshevism,
Nazism aimed to create a “New Man”
who in this case intensified the evils of the
“old Adam” and who, as with Bolshevism,
would discard the moral limits that are
integral to any modicum of decency and
civilized human existence. In Burleigh’s
capacious view, the Holocaust “does not
exhaust everything there is to say about
National Socialism.” But this crime that
cried out to heaven was indeed the horrific logical consequence of a fevered social
doctrine that reduced man to a “beast of
prey” and that rejected any superintending principle above the human will.

The Church and the New Barbarism
In both The Third Reich and Sacred
Causes,3 Burleigh emphasizes the widely
unknown or deliberately ignored fact that
the strongest opposition to Nazi ideology and criminality came from conservative “men of God.” This is no accident.
While left-wing critics of Nazism wrongly
saw in it only a virulent version of either
“late capitalism” or German nationalism, its conservative Christian opponents
were far more sensitive to the movement’s
profoundly antitraditional character. The
more discerning among them saw in Nazism nothing less than a “revolution of
nihilism.” And not a few of them courageously rose to the challenge of resisting
the new barbarism.
In addition to Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen, the “lion of Münster,” who in a series of famous sermons
in 1941 denounced the murderous Nazi
euthanasia campaign, some of the Austrian and German bishops did not shrink
from attacking the “racist madness” of
Nazism. In his great encyclical Mit brennender sorge (1938), written pointedly in
German and clandestinely smuggled into

Germany, Pope Pius XI attacked modern
racialism, the cynical Nazi appropriation
of Christian symbolism, nationalist idolatry, and a false cult of human greatness.
Likewise, in the first encyclical of his pontificate, Summi pontificis, released in the
fall of 1939, Pius XII affirmed the “fundamental unity” of the human race and
expressed his profound sympathy for the
plight of Poland. The whole world had no
doubt at the time whom the same pontiff
had in mind in his 1942 Christmas message when he spoke of “the hundreds of
thousands of innocent people put to death
or doomed to slow extinction, sometimes
merely because of their race or descent.”
This prudent, perhaps too prudent, diplomat-pope, despising National Socialism
but solicitous of putting an end to a suicidal total war, helped inspire the heroic
witness of groups like Témoignage chrétien
in France (whose anti-Nazi pamphleteers
included such eminent philosophers and
theologians as Gaston Fessard and Henri
de Lubac) as well as the Italian Catholics
who saved tens of thousands of Jews in
the fall of 1944 when the Nazis unleashed
full scale war against the Jews in occupied
Italy.
The rewriting of history to suggest that
the Christian West was somehow culpable
in the murderous agenda of the National
Socialists is one of the greatest intellectual distortions of our time. Burleigh has
done a great service by recovering an appreciation for the impregnable wall that
separated the Christian religion—with
its affirmation of the fundamental unity
of the human race and of conscience informed by right reason—from both the
“horrors of applied rationality” (communism) and the National Socialist religion of the absolutized human will. This
project of historical and moral restoration
achieves something like its finished form
in his magisterial two-volume history of
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE R EVIEW—Spring 2008
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political religion, Earthly Powers4 and Sacred Causes.

The Theory and Practice
of Political Religion
In keeping with a venerable conservativeliberal tradition, in both works Burleigh
highlights the links between Jacobinism,
the secular “civil religion” par excellence,
and the political religions that would do
so much to despoil the twentieth century.
Jacobinism was not only proto-totalitarian, it was the prototype for later and more
fully developed ideological justifications
of terror and tyranny.
Burleigh observes in Sacred Causes that
the term “political religion” has a “more
venerable history than many imagine.” It
was widely used after 1917 to describe the
new regimes established by Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. In the middle of
the nineteenth century the French historian and political philosopher Alexis de
Tocqueville had already invoked the idea
of political or secular religion. He did so
in the opening section of The Old Regime
and the Revolution (1856) when discussing the social passions unleashed by the
French Revolution of 1789. The Revolution “took on the appearance of a religious
revolution” despite the contempt in which
its progenitors and principal actors held
the Catholic Church in particular, and the
Christian religion in general. It brought
forth a uniquely modern fusion of religious sentiment and rationalism, a “new
kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it
is true, without God, without rituals, and
without life after death, but one which
nevertheless, like Islam, flooded the earth
with its soldiers, apostles, and martyrs.”
For its twentieth-century analysts and
critics—heirs to both Tocqueville and
Burke—secular religions, especially in
their totalitarian forms, are so horrific
44
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and so destructive of human dignity in
no small part because they are idolatrous.
They erase the distinction, integral to
Christian civilization and to decent and
humane governance, between the things
of God and the things of Caesar. They
establish an unprecedented monism that
makes the theocratic despotisms of the
past seem humanly bearable. But—and
here Burleigh’s approach is wanting, or at
least incomplete—it is still necessary to
painstakingly confront the philosophical
sources of the misplaced modern emphasis on human self-sovereignty. As Pierre
Manent has pointed out, for example,
communism does not stand as an antithesis to modern democracy; rather, it can
be located on a continuum with modern
democracy in its inebriated confidence
in Man as the “sovereign author” of the
human world, in its faith in progress and
“humanitarian” values, and in its belief
that human beings are essentially “historical” beings unbeholden either to nature
or to God. At the same time, communism
destroyed everything that is decent and
good about the democratic order. Political
philosophy is indispensable for unraveling this conundrum and for more fully
exploring the vexing question of the relationship between modern rationalism and
the totalitarian movements and ideologies
that “radicalize” rationalism’s underlying
premises.

Burleigh’s Project
In Earthly Powers, Burleigh surveys the
prehistory of the twentieth-century totalitarianisms. He provides a fascinating account of Puritan messianism, the
proto-totalitarianism of the Jacobins, the
quasi-religious cult of the nation, the rise
of humanitarianism as a self-conscious
social ethos and even as a “religion” in the
pseudophilosophical expression given to it
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by August Comte. A powerful chapter inspired by Dostoevsky’s Devils explores the
deep convergence of moral nihilism and
political fanaticism in nineteenth-century
Russia. Burleigh also expertly chronicles
the response of the Christian churches to
the rise of secular ideology, as well as their
responses to the modern “social question.”
His book breaks off with the bloody apocalypse of 1914, when liberal and Christian
Europe confronted the abyss and was on
the verge of committing suicide.
Sacred Causes picks up where Earthly
Powers leaves off. The twentieth century
witnessed a radical intensification of Sturzo’s “abusive exploitation of the human religious sentiment”—an exploitation that,
like “earlier attempts to realize heaven or
earth,” would result in “hell for many people.” In the nineteenth century the “dystopian strain” mainly occurred at the level
of thought (Burleigh provocatively refers
to “the hare brained schemes” of August
Comte and Charles Fourier, the “moral insanity of Russian nihilists,” as well as “the
scientific socialism” of Marx and Engels
“which was morally insane in other ways”).
The twentieth century turned out to be the
century of applied ideology, of secular religions warring against the tripartite Western heritage of biblical religion, classical
wisdom, and liberal constitutionalism.

The Totalitarian Political Religions
The most important chapter in Sacred
Causes is the synthetic second chapter
on “The Totalitarian Political Religions.”
It brilliantly surveys historical facts and
moral perspectives that have largely been
forgotten, displaced by the dominant “antifascist” narrative of the twentieth century. That narrative gives communism a
free pass by locating evil in the twentieth
century in an ill-defined “fascism,” a word
that is sometimes used so indiscriminately

as to include both National Socialism and
the civilization it set out to destroy. In the
antifascist narrative, the central drama of
the twentieth century was not the struggle
between “liberal and Christian civilization” and a new ideological barbarism but
rather the never-ending struggle between
“progress”—whose ultimate victory is
guaranteed—and the forces of “reaction.”
In a more moderate form, this faith in
progress is the common faith—or common illusion—of modern democratic societies. Burleigh’s work is blessedly free of
such facile progressivism.
The chapter on “The Totalitarian Political Religions” shows exactly what was
at stake in the instantiation of the “secular
messianism” that first came to the forefront in the nineteenth century. Early on,
Burleigh quotes the Russian religious philosopher Semyon Frank—a Jewish convert
to Orthodox Christianity and one of the
contributors to the remarkable collection
Vehki (Landmarks). That 1909 manifesto
powerfully challenged the Russian intelligentsia’s addiction to “progressive” ideals
that eschewed the spiritual life, renounced
any ethical affirmation of limits, and that
demonstrated limitless indulgence toward
the revolutionary Left. In his contribution
to Vehki Frank took sure aim at the “nihilistic moralism” of the prerevolutionary
Russian intelligentsia:
Sacrificing himself for the sake of this idea,
he does not hesitate to sacrifice other people
for it. Among his contemporaries he sees either merely the victims of the world’s evil he
dreams of eradicating or the perpetrators of
that evil. . . . This feeling of hatred for the enemies of the people forms the concrete and
active psychological foundation of his life.
Thus the great love of mankind of the future
gives birth to a great hatred for people; the
passion for organizing an earthly paradise
becomes a passion for destruction. (SC, 39)

This “passion for destruction” is coextensive with the “ideological” dream to
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE R EVIEW—Spring 2008
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create another world, another reality. The
best philosophical critics of the ideological project have shown how the aspiration
to “change the world,” to alter the structure of reality, gives rise to a “surreality,”
an imaginary present and future that is at
odds with the nature of men and societies
and even the ontological structure of the
real world. In their own way, the ideologists are aware of this. The auspicious gap
between reality and ideological surreality
can only be bridged by what Solzhenitsyn
in his Nobel Lecture has called the twin pillars of the ideological project: violence and
lies. However, the revolutionary enterprise
necessarily becomes routinized, stale, and
sclerotic (witness the final decades of the
Soviet regime—the “years of stagnation,”
as they came to be called). Still, the never
wholly extinguished impulse of the ideological project is a deep-seated nihilistic
Manicheanism. The Bolshevik outlook
remained to the end “essentially Manichean, dividing the world into good and evil,
light and darkness, old and new, a view
which led to the demonization of their enemies” (SC, 75).
These enemies famously ended up including “heretics” within their own ranks.
The demonized included not merely “class
enemies” (the bourgeoisie, aristocrats, independent peasants), not only “heretical”
communists, but especially those intellectuals and ordinary believers who embodied a more traditional understanding of the
world. In particular, the Bolsheviks “resolved to eradicate Christianity as such.”
They unleashed several waves of savage
persecution against the Orthodox Church
that are chronicled in detail by Burleigh.
In the first wave, bishops and priests were
brutally murdered or subjected to show
trials. In a second wave of persecution that
coincided with the collectivization of agriculture, churches were closed and bells removed from churches that had been at the
46

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE R EVIEW—Spring 2008

center of Russian village life for centuries.
And from 1937 to 1941, tens of thousands
of priests and nuns were killed, while others were sent to labor camps to perish on
the tundra. Eventually, the leadership of
the Orthodox Church was infiltrated and
even controlled by the atheistic authorities. When reflecting on this scandalous
fact, it must be remembered that Orthodox Christians experienced the worst persecution of the Christian religion in human history; untold numbers of believers
conducted themselves in a spirit of fidelity
and suffered martyrdom.
Burleigh also considers the other manifestations of ideological Manicheanism
in the interwar period. He describes the
intense decades-long struggle between
Italian fascism and the Catholic Church
to shape the lives and loyalties of young
people. He also traces the myriad ways
the Nazis dehumanized their enemies.
The evocation of “blood”—of bloodlust
and sacrifice and destruction as ends in
themselves—was central to the Nazi view
of man and nature. And the crude and incoherent assault on Judaism as the source
of all the evils in the contemporary world
(Jews being blamed simultaneously for
“plutocratic” liberalism and rapacious
Bolshevism) was at the core of the Nazis’
fevered redefinition of reality.
The Bolsheviks earlier had created a
secular “theocracy” that aped the hierarchies of traditional religion without
any of its moral wisdom or restraints. In
one respect at least the Nazis went a step
further. Their secular religion promoted
an emotional and aesthetic intoxication,
symbolized by the Nuremburg rallies, that
made “everyone” a participant in these deluded collective rituals. The SS, Burleigh
suggests, was the nihilist avant-garde of a
hypermodern pagan religion that bowed
to nothing except its own willfulness.
The men of the SS were “insanely fertile
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in destructiveness” and “their subscription to the codes of their own bureaucracy
was never incompatible with the most irrational, pathological fanaticism.” This
combination of bureaucracy and “moral
autism,” so eloquently described by Burleigh, would reveal its demonic face in the
murderous rage of the Einsatzgruppen on
the eastern front, who killed millions even
before the systematic unfolding of the Final Solution, and in the sadistic and cold
“industrial rationality” of the Nazi death
camps.

The Church Between Liberalism
and Totalitarianism
In an important chapter in Sacred Causes
entitled “The Church in the Age of the Dictators” Burleigh provides an exhaustive account of “the murderous conflict between
church and state” in Mexico, Spain, and
Soviet Russia during the interwar period.
It is easy today to chastise the church for
its hesitancy in accommodating itself to
the full range of “liberal” and “republican”
movements and regimes. But Burleigh reveals just how “illiberal” various forms
of republicanism could be (the murder of
7,000 clergy in republican Spain between
July and December 1936 is the most chilling manifestation of this phenomenon.)
While responding forthrightly to ferocious
anticlericalism in Mexico in the 1920s and
1930s as well as to the persecution “raging
within the unhappy borders of Russia,”
Pope Pius XI continued Leo XIII’s policy
of semi-neutrality with respect to forms
of government. Burleigh recounts, for example, how the Vatican initially accepted
the establishment of the Spanish Republic
in 1931 with equanimity. The Vatican also
showed much more moderation and good
sense than the Spanish episcopacy in its
dealings with Franco during the Spanish
Civil War (the Vatican was rightly suspi-

cious of Franco’s alliance with the Falangists, a secular movement of the totalitarian
Right). Nonetheless, even the profoundly
antitotalitarian Pius XI, a persistent and eloquent critic of the totalizing aspirations of
the pagan state, remained deeply suspicious
of liberal or bourgeois republicanism in its
dominant forms. Not enough distinctions
were made, and constitutional democracy
was identified with the most extreme versions of philosophical liberalism. The
Catholic Church in the United Kingdom
and the United States provided the most
notable exception to this antidemocratic
tendency in Catholic thought.
As Burleigh shows, the church had an
honorable record in fighting totalitarian
political religions because it knew exactly
what was at stake in the ideological “sacralization” of politics. However, it underestimated the moral resources of constitutional democracy and overestimated
the prospects for Catholic “corporatism”
in countries such as Austria and Portugal.
At the end of the Second World War, the
pontificate of Pope Pius XII “decided to
abandon its prudent agnosticism towards
forms of government in favor of democracy.” This change was motivated in part
by a deepening appreciation of the crucial role of “human rights” in the proper
defense of human dignity (a “Christian
democratic” position theorized by the influential Thomistic philosopher Jacques
Maritain). In addition, a more liberal and
activist ethos had arisen out of Christian
currents in the resistance movements during the Second World War. There was also
the need to mobilize Catholics for active
citizenship and the defense of basic liberties against the Communist threat in
France, Germany, and Italy after 1945.
Burleigh tells this important story with
the requisite nuance and scholarly care.
In chapter 6 of Sacred Causes (“The
Road to Unfreedom: the Imposition of
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE R EVIEW—Spring 2008
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Communism after 1945”) Burleigh tells curred on the eve of an immense cultural
the other half of the story: the brutal im- revolution that revealed the self–radicalposition of Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian- izing propensities of democracy in the
ism on unwilling peoples in east–central modern world. It was not an auspicious
Europe after 1945. The chapter provides conjunction. I am, of course, referring to
an exhaustive account of the various as- the cultural and political transformation
saults on the churches in the newly “liber- of the 1960s. This revolution unleashed
ated” Europe. Burleigh makes the heroism powerful antinomian and demotic forces
and moral grandeur of persecuted lead- lurking beneath the surface of seemingly
ers of the Catholic Church such as cardi- complacent bourgeois societies.
The churches were lamentably slow in
nals Mindszenty, Beran, and Wyszynski
known to new generations who will surely appreciating what was at stake in a full
have never heard their names. Burleigh’s accommodation to the forces of late modernity. A hedoconclusion to this
nistic youth culchapter is worthy of
ture became the
extended citation,
order of the day
not least because it
and
authoritareminds us of the
tive institutions
crucial role of the
were challenged
churches in provideverywhere. The
ing a space, howevCatholic Church’s
er limited, for “civil
salutary efforts at
society,” and in preaggiornamento, of
serving an image of
liturgical, spirithe moral order in
tual, and theosocieties that had
logical renewal,
been brutalized by
The extremism of ideology:
all too often deideological
lies.
leftists desecrating a corpse in 1930s Spain
generated
into
Burleigh writes
what Maritain,
Within a remarkable short time totalitarian
no reactionary himself, suggestively called
rule had been reimposed on half a continent
“kneeling before the world.” As believers
using a combination of force and fraud.
had a harder time replicating their beliefs
. . . Although they were subjected to relentless assault from state-sponsored atheism,
among their children, prominent Westthe Christian Churches remained the only
ern churchmen flirted with progressivist
licensed sanctuaries from the prevailing
ideologies and turned a blind eye to the
world of brutality and lies. Appropriately
fate of Christians behind the Iron Curenough . . . they played an important role in
tain. Most ominously, Christians had an
the overthrow of Communism forty years
increasingly difficult time articulating the
later. (SC, 344 )
ontological and moral structure that alone
The Catholic Church’s positive accom- provides a sturdy foundation for the libermodation to liberal democracy was a mat- ties and obligations of men. Burleigh tells
ter of both principle and prudence and re- the story with his characteristic élan and
veals that august institution’s deep-rooted does justice to all the appropriate nuances.
capacity for self–renewal. But the church’s But this issue cries out for a more search“Christian Democratic” turn also oc- ing reflection on the promise and risks
48
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inherent in the church’s accommodation
to democratic modernity. Were the antinomian excesses of the 1960s inherent in
the propensities of democracy itself? Were
they bound to come to the forefront once
the traditional elements of our societies
lost their vigor and self-confidence? More
fundamentally, how much has the cultural revolution of the 1960s undermined the
continuity of Western civilization? Did a
new civilization—antitraditional, hostile
to political and social authority, and essentially non-Christian—come into being during those heady and tumultuous
days? These questions arise naturally, so
to speak, from Burleigh’s own exposition.
They highlight the difficulties inherent in
any unqualified assent of the Christian
churches to democracy, not as a form of
government, but as a comprehensive or total way of life.

Today’s World:
Islam and Secular Europe
In the tenth and final chapter of Sacred
Causes (“Cubes, Domes and Death Cults:
Europe after 9/11”) Burleigh recounts the
events leading up to “the day that changed
the world,” September 11, 2001. He is undoubtedly right that it is necessary to read
Conrad’s The Secret Agent or Dostoevsky’s
Demons in order to truly fathom the
minds and hearts of those contemporary
“nihilists” who, like their nineteenth-century predecessors, are intoxicated with
conspiratorial violence and their own set
of deadly ideological abstractions. But
Burleigh unfortunately overstates the case
when he reduces Islamist terrorism to “a
cover version of ideas and movements that
have occurred in modern Western societies.” As a result he concedes too much to
terms like “Islamo-fascism” that in my
view obscure more than they clarify.
Burleigh is on firmer ground when he

criticizes contemporary European elites
for their lack of self-confidence and for
their willful restriction of European memory. He rightly criticizes those elites who
want to reduce the European inheritance
to a set of “humanitarian” abstractions
as if “democratic” Europe is intelligible
without some substantial reference to its
Christian past. But like many conservative-minded defenders of the Western tradition, Burleigh makes too many claims
for the Christian roots of “modern liberty.”
Modern “autonomy,” the quest to create
individuals shorn of attachments to every
external or “heteronomous” domination,
has profound roots in anti-Christian philosophical thought. Those associated with
the radical Enlightenment self-consciously aimed to create a radically new civilization that owed nothing to the moral inheritance of classical Christianity. These
important reservations aside, Burleigh is
right to stress the necessarily Christian
component of any substantive or morally
serious antitotalitarian defense of human
dignity. Christianity’s “transcendental focus has set bounds to what the powerful
could not, or more importantly, should not
do by providing moral exemplars of good
kingship and evil tyranny” (as Bertrand
de Jouvenel has argued modern doctrines
of sovereignty—of human self-sovereignty—point in a much more “monistic” or
totalitarian direction). One conclusion is
clear: the liberal “separation” of state and
society depends upon individuals who
are fully more “Christian” than “autonomous” in their self–conception and moral
bearing.
Sacred Causes has the additional merit
of confirming one of the deepest insights
of the best “dissident” thought of our time.
In light of the profoundly antihuman experiments to live in a world beyond good
and evil, it is necessary to rethink our understanding of the moral foundations of
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE R EVIEW—Spring 2008
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liberty. As the Czech Catholic dissident
Vaclav Benda strikingly put it in a remark
quoted by Burleigh, in order to overcome
totalitarianism, it was necessary “to shake
that evil off, escape its power, and to seek
the truth.” That invitation to open ourselves to truth has immense implications
for the responsible exercise of freedom in
our all-too-jaded liberal societies.

Paying Tribute to Those
Who Understood
In all the volumes of his trilogy Burleigh
pays tribute to a series of thinkers “who
saw clearly . . . what these movements and
regimes were,” who understood without
equivocation their pretenses to change reality, their psychological commonalities,
and their support for the most hyperbolic
violence. The fact that Burleigh provides
nearly identical tributes in all three books
suggests not only the extent of his debt
to the insights of these thinkers but also
the sad fact that these wise and humane
theorist-witnesses are largely unknown
or ignored in “mainstream” intellectual
quarters today. It is an indictment of the
academy that apologists for European
totalitarianism such as the Hungarian
philosopher Georg Lukacs or the French
“existentialist” Jean-Paul Sartre remain
prominent in our intellectual life while
those who truly illuminated the tragedies
of the age are cast into obscurity by the
gatekeepers of intellectual prestige.
Waldemar Gurian (1902–54) is a particularly important influence on Burleigh.
This Russian Jewish convert to Catholicism came with his mother to Germany
in 1912 and fled the country in 1934 when
it became apparent that he was being targeted by the Nazi regime. The author of an
incisive critique of Communist theory and
practice (Bolshevism: Theory and Practice
[1932]), he was a scourge of Brown and
50
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Red totalitarianism alike. From his Swiss
exile in 1936 he published the massive
Hitler and the Christians, warning Christians that the Nazis would do their best
to promote their racialist doctrines under
the more palatable guise of a restoration
of the spirit of Christian Germany against
the alleged perfidies of the Jews. Burleigh
rightly credits Gurian with “the most important analysis of Nazi Germany from a
Catholic point of view.” Gurian went on to
become the founder of the Review of Politics at Notre Dame, where he brought the
penetrating thought of the best European
writers (including Eric Voegelin, Jacques
Maritain, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt) to bear on “the crisis of our time.”
Burleigh is also deeply indebted to the
various efforts of Eric Voegelin (1901–85)
to come to terms with totalitarianism. Recognizing that “his thought is immensely
complicated,” he nonetheless locates “one
powerful moral consideration that drove
it.” This is an aversion, in Voegelin’s own
words, to the ideological “swindlers” who
gained a “pseudo-identity through asserting one’s power,” through participating in
or justifying mass murder. Burleigh highlights Voegelin’s critique of Nazi “racial
science” as well as his affirmation, simultaneously moral and scientific, of “the fundamental commonalities between human
beings across reaches of time.” Like Voegelin, Burleigh appreciates that “[e]vil (is) a
palpable actor in the world” and that the
“demoralization” of social science leaves
scholars “emasculated” before “evil, immoral, and unethical political ideologies.”

Aron’s Faith Without Illusions
Burleigh also pays his respects to “one
of the finest minds in twentieth century
France, the liberal conservative sociologist and journalist Raymond Aron.” He
praises Aron (1905–83) for his sobriety
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and for his “impassioned but limpidly
expressed lucidity,” as accurate a description of Aron’s voice that I have ever come
across. Burleigh is particularly impressed
by Aron’s magisterial two-part analysis
of the secular religions (“The Future of
Secular Religions”) that first appeared in
the exile journal La France Libre in July
and August 1944.5 Aron stands out among
Burleigh’s intellectual guides in part because he was not a believer. A self-described “de-Judaized Jew,” he nonetheless
had genuine respect for religion. He liked
to say that while he could not affirm the
truth of transcendental religion in any
unqualified way, he had no wish or right
to “negate” it. He was an incisive critic of
Marxist “prophetism,” of Marxism’s revolutionary historicism and its conflation of
facts with desires. He despised the “idolatory” as well as the fanaticism inherent in
the Marxist religion of “hyper-rationalism” and pointed out its deep roots in the
modern project of making human beings
“sovereign lords of nature through knowledge and his own will.” In his writings in
La France Libre during the Second World
War, Aron took particular aim at “the pessimistic irrational religion of the Nazis.”
Writing in 1944, Aron appreciated the
untenability of the ideological lie. “It is not
easy,” he wrote slyly, “for representatives
of homo sapiens to believe that Mussolini
is always right or that Hitler’s words define
good and evil.” But Aron was a chastened
or conservative-minded liberal because he
knew that liberal rationalism in its nineteenth-century expressions was neither
philosophically viable nor capable of moving the souls of men. Human beings in every time and place need “faith in ideas and
in men.” When elites in bourgeois societies
succumbed to cynicism and lost faith in
the rational and moral foundations of a free
and decent political order, fervent ideologists guaranteed that faith would be used

at the service of “barbaric fury.” Aron offered no guarantee that a revitalized liberalism, buttressed by a renewed “conservative” confidence in the integrity of a moral
order above the will of man, would finally
win the day against the totalitarians. But
in the elegiac conclusion of his 1944 essay,
he cited the words of Tacitus that had been
read out to the first Free French volunteers
at the end of June, 1940: “One need not
hope in order to try, nor succeed in order
to persevere.” “I saw,” he wrote, “in that
phrase and I see still, the watchword of revolt, always vanquished yet always victorious—the revolt of conscience.”

Conclusion
In Michael Burleigh the political religions
have found a historian who resists the “demoralization” of the age, the tendency to
write history as if moral evaluation and
the imperatives of conscience do not matter. His work is a powerful challenge to the
“antifascist” vulgate which confuses authority with authoritarianism, and which
downplays the essential affinities between
totalitarianism of the Left and the Right.
Readers of Burleigh’s work cannot help but
reflect on the fact that all too often “progressive democracy,” as the Hungarian
political philosopher Aurel Kolnai called
it, shares with discredited totalitarianism
a blind confidence in the sovereignty and
self-assertion of man. The antitotalitarian
thinkers to whom Burleigh pays such welldeserved tribute all appreciated that the
ultimate roots of totalitarianism lay in the
human tendency, quintessentially modern
yet as old as Adam, to forget that men are
not gods. A democratic civilization that has
truly absorbed this lesson will have already
begun the ascent from the most problematic assumptions of theoretical modernity.
Hence the vital contemporary need of histories of this quality and insight.
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